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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1397 
__________ 
 
MATTHEW RIBOLDI, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARREN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION OF 
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES (WCDHS);  
WORK FIRST NEW JERSEY (WFNJ) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-00572) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
August 21, 2019 
 
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2019) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Matthew Riboldi challenges the District Court’s decision 
dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
 In October 2015, Riboldi filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey 
against the Warren County Department of Human Services (“WCDHS”), alleging 
“[s]ubstantial violations of Federal and N[.]J. state Acts including violations of 
constitutional rights.”  (Dist. Ct. docket # 1-1, at 2.)  WCDHS removed the case to the 
District Court, and a United States Magistrate Judge subsequently directed Riboldi to file 
an amended complaint.  Riboldi did so in May 2016, naming WCDHS and Work First 
New Jersey (“WFNJ”) as defendants.  The amended complaint alleged that WCDHS’s 
and WFNJ’s employees “failed to provide [Riboldi] with ADA accommodations[] and 
adhere to the guidelines of the NJ Public assit. [sic] Handbook manual.”  (Dist. Ct. docket 
# 13, at 5.)  Riboldi claimed that these violations caused his various medical conditions, 
including post-traumatic stress disorder and adjustment disorder, and he sought $64 
million in damages. 
 The New Jersey Attorney General’s Office entered its appearance on behalf of 
WFNJ and moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).1  At a September 2017 hearing, the District Court granted that 
                                              
1 As the District Court explained, WFNJ is simply the name of New Jersey’s welfare 
program.  See N.J. Admin. Code § 10:90-1.1. 
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motion, dismissing the complaint in its entirety without prejudice to Riboldi’s ability to 
file a second amended complaint.  The District Court explained that, while Riboldi “has 
shown that he’s an individual with disabilities” and “may have been excluded from 
benefits or programs,” “there is no fact or date as to the time and place when this denial 
occurred or by whom this denial occurred,” and “there is no allegation that exclusion 
from the program was by reason of his disability.”  (Dist. Ct. docket # 44, at 6.) 
 Riboldi filed his second amended complaint in October 2017.  This pleading, 
which used an unstructured, narrative format (his previous pleadings used form 
complaints), was not a model of clarity.  Riboldi appeared to allege, inter alia, that the 
defendants had denied him certain benefits or services due to his disability, and that they 
had ignored his request to receive some accommodation at the fair-rights hearing that was 
held in connection with his application for benefits.  This pleading did not make clear 
whether Riboldi was seeking damages or some other form of relief. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6).  In April 2018, the District Court granted these motions and dismissed the case 
with prejudice, concluding that affording Riboldi further leave to amend would be futile.  
After the District Court dismissed, with prejudice, WCDHS’s cross-claims and 
counterclaims in January 2019, Riboldi timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
the District Court’s decision dismissing Riboldi’s second amended complaint is plenary.  
See In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 
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243 (3d Cir. 2012).  To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading “must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  Although “[t]he 
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” it does require that the 
pleading show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  A pleading that merely “tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of 
further factual enhancement” is insufficient.  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The District Court explained that, to the extent that Riboldi sought relief under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, his second amended complaint did not state a viable 
claim for several reasons.  One of those reasons was that this pleading failed to allege 
facts plausibly indicating that he was denied benefits or services on account of his 
disability.  See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).  To the extent that 
Riboldi sought relief under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 
connection with his request for an accommodation at the fair-rights hearing, the District 
Court explained that he had failed to state a viable claim because it was unclear from his 
conclusory allegations whether he had even requested a specific accommodation, whether 
such a request was properly filed, and whether such a request was properly denied.  For 
these reasons, Riboldi failed to set forth a plausible claim for relief, and thus we agree 
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with the District Court that it was appropriate to dismiss the second amended complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6).2   
We also agree with the District Court’s decision to deny Riboldi further leave to 
amend his claims.  See, e.g., Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 
113 (3d Cir. 2018).  In considering this issue, we have examined the allegations 
contained in his appellate briefing and in his response to the motions to dismiss his 
second amended complaint.  These allegations also fail to set forth facts plausibly 
indicating that the defendants discriminated against him on account of his disability 
and/or otherwise violated his federal or constitutional rights.  Because these allegations 
are deficient and Riboldi has already had two chances to amend his claims, we see no 
reason to disturb the District Court’s conclusion that granting him further leave to amend 
would be futile. 
 We have considered the various arguments raised in Riboldi’s briefing and 
conclude that they lack merit and do not require further discussion here.  In view of the 
above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.            
 
                                              
2 The District Court did not liberally construe Riboldi’s second amended complaint as 
raising state-law claims.  But even if Riboldi had intended to raise such claims in that 
pleading, it would have been appropriate for the District Court to dismiss those claims as 
well.  See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“This Court has 
recognized that, where the claim[s] over which the district court has original jurisdiction 
[are] dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state 
claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties 
provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
